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11. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and 
for Twin Falls County, Honorable Jon J . Shindurling, presiding. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to 
an abuse of discretion standard ofreview. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893,901, 104 P.3d 367,375 
(2004). Therefore, the party disputing an award of attorney fees has the burden of showing an 
abuse of discretion. Id. This determination requires application of a three-factor test: "( 1) whether 
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an 
exercise ofreason." Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486-87, 65 P.3d 502, 508-09 (2003). 
Whether a district court has correctly determined that a case is based on a commercial 
transaction for the purpose ofl.C. § 12-120(3) is a question oflaw, subject to free review. Lincoln 
Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105,408 P.3d 465, 472- 73 (2017). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Case 
This case presents questions regarding the district court's decision to award costs and deny 
fees . Specifically, the Court must decide whether or not the Appellants may even challenge the 
district court's ruling regarding costs, when the district court held that it would allow Appellants' 
costs, if they would only notice up a hearing on the matter. 1 Further, the Court must decide whether 
or not the Appellants are entitled to fees under§ LC. 12-120(3) where there was no commercial 
1 The Appellants never followed the court's instructions to do so, choosing instead to bring this appeal. 
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transaction between the parties to the suit or under § I.C. 12-121, where there were legitimate, 
triable issues of fact and law. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Kenworth Sales Company ("Kenworth") is a licensed dealer engaged in the business of 
selling and buying commercial trucks. R. 185. Skinner Trucking, Inc. ("STI") is a business 
engaged in the commodity transportation business. R. 185-186. The two companies have done 
business together for more than forty years, during which STI leased a number of trucks sold by 
Kenworth. R. 186; Tr. 67.2 GE TF Trust ("GE") is a financing entity that, among other things, 
purchases vehicles from Kenworth for lease to companies such as STI. R. 186. 
In 08/18/11, STI selected three new Kenworth trucks, which Kenwo11h sold to GE and GE 
leased to STI under a four-year TRAC lease. Id. The provisions of the lease established a residual 
payoff amount that was due on each of the three trucks at the end of the lease period. Id. That 
amount was set at $58,051.20 per truck. R. 187. At the end of the lease period, STI had the option 
of purchasing the trucks for that amount or turning them in and waiting for the trucks to be sold. 
R. 186. If the sales amount exceeded the residual amount, STI was to receive a surplus. Id. If the 
trucks were to sell for less than that amount, STI was obligated to pay the difference. Id. James 
and David Skinner personally guaranteed STI's lease obligations to GE. Id. 
As the lease period ended in October of 2015, STI was experiencing financial hardship. 
Id. Therefore, STI found itself unable to (1) sell the trucks, (2) purchase the trucks by paying off 
the residual amount, or (3) obtain financing to pay off the residual amount. Id. At this time, STI 
was also behind on its lease payments to GE by approximately $7,000.00. Id. 
2 Most references to the Transcript on Appeal in this case will be to the transcript prepared by Tracy Barksdale, 
which includes the trial transcript. To avoid any confusion, these references will use the designation "Tr." while any 
citation to the transcript prepared by Candice Childers will use the designation "Supp. Tr." for supplemental 
transcript. 
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Kenworth was aware of these circumstances and, as STI was a valued long-term customer, 
did not wish to see its financial situation worsen if the trucks were to be sold quickly at auction. 
R. 186-187. Ken worth discussed the matter with James Skinner on a number of occasions and 
ultimately, in the late fall and early winter of 2015, STI surrendered the trucks to Ken worth. R. 
187. At the time of surrender, the value of each truck was $42,000.00. Id. 
Kenworth subsequently paid off the residual amount on each truck and the $7,073.17 in 
delinquent lease payments, ending the Defendants' obligation under the lease to GE. R. 187. This 
was done in an effort to buy STI more time to make good on their financial obligations, without 
incurring additional late fees and legal costs. R. 186-187; Tr. 111-112. In January of 2016, 
Kenworth invoiced STI for $55,226.77, the difference between the value of the trucks at surrender 
and their respective residual amounts, as well as the unpaid lease payments. R. 187. The trucks 
remained unsold on Kenworth' s lot until the Spring of 2017, when they sold for $34,500 each. R. 
188. Neither STI, Jim Skinner, nor David Skinner ever responded to Kenworth's invoice. Tr. 76-
77. 
C. The Proceedings Below 
On 7 /26/16, the Respondent filed a Complaint against the Appellants alleging unjust 
enrichment. An Answer was filed on 8/18/16 and on 12/6/17, a one-day court trial was held, after 
which the parties were given until 12/11/17 to file closing briefs. Each party submitted briefs and 
the court subsequently issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the "Decision"). R. 
127-136. In the Decision, the court entered judgment in favor of the Appellants. The court also 
stated in its decision that the parties should bear their own costs. R. 135. 
On 12/29/17, the Appellants filed a Motion for Fees and Costs, a Memorandum of Fees 
and Costs, a Motion for Reconsideration, a Declaration in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
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and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. Through these filings, the 
Appellants sought reconsideration of the trial court's determination that the parties should bear 
their own costs. In their Memorandum of Costs and Fees, the Appellants requested a total of 
$18,000.30 in fees and $564.29 in costs. 
The Respondents filed an Objection to Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs, as well as 
an Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. A hearing was held on 1/16/18, after 
which the court issued its Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider. R. 
197-201. On 3/14/18, the court issued a document titled Corrected Memorandum Opinion 
Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and Partially Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, in which it held that as a prevailing party, the Appellants were entitled 
to costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d). R. 204-210. The court acknowledged that the Appellants' costs had 
already been briefed and directed the Appellants to notice the matter for a hearing. Id. The 
Appellants ignored that directive and filed this appeal instead. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Is the issue of costs ripe for determination on appeal, given the fact that the district 
court held that it would grant costs to the Appellants following a hearing on the 
matter, which the Appellants never acted on? 
B. Did the district court err in determining that fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) were 
unavailable in this case, as there was no commercial transaction between the parties? 
C. Did the district court err in determining that Kenworth had a good faith, factual basis for 
its claim and, therefore, that fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121 were unwarranted? 
D. Is LR.C.P. 68 a valid basis for the award of attorney fees? 
E. Is the Respondent entitled to fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 40 and 41, as 
well as LC.§ 12-121? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Matter of Costs Lacks Ripeness. 
An issue must be "ripe" in order for there to be a live case or controversy appropriate for 
judicial review. Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 317, 92 P.3d 1063, 1064 (2002); see also 
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,642, 778 P.2d 757, 764 (1989) ("Ripeness asks whether 
there is any need for court action at the present time."). The ripeness doctrine "requires a petitioner 
or plaintiff to prove I) that the case presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and 
substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adjudication." Paddison 
Scenic Props., Family Trust, L.C. v. Idaho Cnty., 153 Idaho 1, 4,278 P.3d 403,406 (2012). 
Here, with regard to the issue of costs, the Appellants admit that they filed a Motion for 
Fees and Costs on December 29, 2017.3 Appellants' Brief, p. 6. Appellants also admit that they 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration that same day and that on February 28, 2018, the district court 
issued an opinion denying their motion. Id. at p. 6-7. Finally, Appellants admit that on March 13, 
2018, the district court issued a corrected order granting costs, at an amount to be determined 
following a hearing. Id. at p. 7. Instead of setting the matter for a hearing, the matter was appealed. 
The Appellants were given the opportunity to receive their requested costs by the district 
court. That opportunity still stands, as the last order of the district court instructed the Appellants 
to notice the issue of costs up for hearing. Therefore, as the matter of costs is still pending before 
the lower court, there is no need for adjudication of the matter on appeal. In short, the issue is 
unripe for determination by this Court and be left to the district court for determination as ordered. 
3 The total requested costs was $564.29. R. 145. 
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B. The Appellants are not Entitled to Fees Under I.C. § 12-120(3), as there was no 
Commercial Transaction between the Parties, either Proven or Alleged. 
LC.§ 12-120(3) states that: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
The Appellants have maintained throughout this litigation, as well as on appeal, that there 
was absolutely no contract or agreement of any kind between them and Kenworth.4 Instead, they 
have argued that there was a commercial transaction sufficient to entitle them to fees under LC. § 
12-120(3 ), and that the district court erred in finding otherwise. The Appellants misunderstand 
the law. 
I.C. § 12-120(3) does not entitle a party to fees based solely on the existence of a 
commercial transaction tangentially related to the case. In order for fees to be awardable under 
this statute, one must show a commercial transaction between the parties. See Bryan Trucking, 
Inc. v. Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 426,374 P.3d 585,589 (2016) ("[O]nly the parties to the commercial 
transaction are entitled to attorney fees under LC. § 12- 120(3)."); Lincoln Land Co., 163 Idaho at 
112, 408 P.3d at 472 (same). There is no evidence on the record of any commercial transaction 
between Respondent and the Appellants that has any relation whatsoever to this case. 
4 See Appellants Brief, p. 14 ("The Trial Court was correct when they found that there was no agreement or contract 
between the two parties .. .. " ). 
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The Appellants, however, argue that because Kenworth sold the trucks at issue to GE, and 
GE then leased them to STI, and because the litigation "would not have arisen but-for the existence 
of the lease," the gravamen of Kenwo1th's lawsuit was a commercial transaction. Appellant's 
Brief p. 14-15. 5 This grossly misstates the underlying nature of the case. 
It is true that "even where no commercial transaction occurs between the parties," Idaho ' s 
appellate courts "have allowed attorney fees to a prevailing party where the losing party has alleged 
a commercial transaction between the parties." DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 
749,758,331 P.3d 491 , 500 (2014); see also Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 470, 259 P.3d 608, 
616 (2011) (holding that "allegations in the complaint that the parties entered into a commercial 
transaction and that the complaining party is entitled to recover based upon that transaction, are 
sufficient to trigger the application of I.C. § 12- 120(3)"). However, Kenworth never alleged 
anything of the sort. 
Kenwo1th alleged ( 1) that STI leased three trucks from GE, (2) that at the end of the lease, 
STI could not pay off its obligations to GE, (3) that because STI was a longtime customer, 
Kenworth paid off STI's obligation to GE, and (4) that STI was unjustly enriched thereby. 
Kenworth never alleged that it was entitled to relief due to any contract or commercial transaction 
between Kenworth and STI and STI argued strenuously at trial against the existence of any 
agreement between the parties that obligated STI to repay Kenworth. In fact, the very lack of a 
commercial transaction between the parties necessitated Kenworth's decision to sue in equity 
instead of at law. 
5 It is also claimed that Kenworth structured the commercial transaction by selling the trucks to GE and that 
Kenworth "admitted at trial that it acted as GE's representatives in the lease." Appellant's Brief, p. 12. No such 
admission was ever made. 
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The fact that there was no commercial transaction between Respondent and the 
Appellants upon which the Respondent's claim for relief was based is dispositive under the statute. 
Therefore, the Appellants' claim for fees under LC. § 12-120(3) should be denied. 
C. The Appellants are not Entitled to Fees Under I.C. § 12-121, as the Case 
Involved Legitimate, Triable Issues of Fact and Law. 
LC.§ 12-121 states that " [i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, umeasonably or without foundation." Idaho's appellate courts have 
determined that attorney fees may not be awarded under this statute if "there is a legitimate, triable 
issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law . ... " Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 
447, 235 P.3d 387,397 (2010). A claim or defense is not frivolous or groundless merely because 
one loses. Lowery v. Bd. o/County Com'rsfor Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 69, 764 P.2d 431,436 
(Ct. App. 1988). Instead, the question is whether the position that was pursued was not only 
incorrect but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation. Id. A denial of fees under LC.§ 12-121 is only reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
The Appellants are not arguing that the district court abused its discretion. Instead, they 
are arguing that "Skinner still believes that Kenworth's claim was frivolous ." Appellant's Brief, 
p. 13. Such re-argument of the merits of their original fees claim is improper here. 
The district court considered the Appellants' argument that Kenworth pursued its case 
frivolously. 6 In its Memorandum Opinion Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, the court 
recognized that an award of fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121 is discretionary,7 set forth the proper 
6 Such argument was made in the Appellants' Memorandum of Fees and Costs and was argued before the court on 
January 16, 2018. 
7 R. 199. 
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legal standard for an award of fees under that statute, 8 and determined through an exercise of 
reason that as Kenworth had a good faith, factual basis for their suit, fees under the statute would 
be denied.9 Therefore, as the district court denied their claim in an exercise of proper discretion, 
the Appellants' renewed claim for fees under LC.§ 12-121 should be denied. 
D. The Appellants are not Entitled to Fees Under I.R.C.P. 68. 
The Appellants appear to be arguing that LR.C.P. 68 entitles them to both costs and fees. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 11 ("The Trial Court was wrong in their application ofLR.C.P. 68, and 
Kenworth should now be required to pay Respondent's fees and costs incurred after Skinner's 
offer of judgment."). However, the Appellant's entire argument regarding Rule 68 addresses 
only costs. Id. at p. 9-11. Nevertheless, the Appellant's Rule 68 fees claim merits discussion. 
LR.C.P. 68 is not a basis for fees. Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309, 
1313 (1987) ("Rule 68 does not include attorney fees."). Consequently, the Appellants' claim 
for fees under Rule 68 should be denied. 
V. FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
LC. § 12-121 allows for the award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party if 
it is determined that the case was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation." Here, Appellants have done so by (1) appealing an order granting costs 
instead of scheduling a hearing so that the issue could be addressed sho11 of appeal, (2) merely 
re-arguing their LC. § 12-121 fees claim, despite the fact that the standard of review on appeal is 
abuse of discretion, and (3) continuing to maintain that I.R.C.P. 68 is a basis for an award of 
attorney's fees. 
8 R. 199-200. 
9 R. 200. 
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Because this appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation, the 
Respondent requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41, as well as 
I.C. § 12-121. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent respectfully requests that this Comi affirm the 
district court's rulings on the issues of costs and fees and that the Respondent be awarded fees 
and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 17th day of July, 2018. 
BENOIT, ALEXANDER, HARWOOD, 
HIGH & MOLLERUP, PLLC 
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